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Abstract
Why do some addicted people chronically fail in their goal to recover, while others succeed? On one 
established view, recovery depends, in part, on efforts of intentional planning agency. This seems 
right, however, firsthand accounts of addiction suggest that the agent’s self- narrative also has an 
influence. This paper presents arguments for the view that self- narratives have independent, self- 
fulfilling momentum that can support or undermine self- governance. The self- narrative structures 
of addicted persons can entrench addiction and alienate the agent from practically feasible recovery 
plans. Strategic re- narration can redirect narrative momentum and therefore support recovery in 
ways that intentional planning alone cannot.
1. Introduction
In a typical trajectory of addiction, the agent 
begins by valuing drug- use but eventually 
finds that drug- use undermines other ends 
that he considers essential to a good life, 
such as his health, relationships, financial 
independence, and so on.1 Some people then 
control their drug- use relatively easily, but 
many struggle for years through multiple 
rounds of various treatments; others never 
recover. If we define self- governance as suc-
cessful pursuit of one’s diachronically stable, 
realistically attainable conception of a good 
life,2 then these struggling addicts suffer from 
a lack of self- governance. But why do some 
addicted people struggle so much more than 
others to regain self- governance?
 Strong addictive desires clearly play a 
role, but they cannot explain all the behavior 
we see, because addicted persons remain 
somewhat reasons- responsive in the face 
of these desires and sometimes recover 
despite them (Levy 2014; Heyman 2009). 
This desire- independent variation is partially 
a function of contingency; more highly 
motivating non- drug options might become 
available, and chances to engage in drug- use 
may decrease. However, most clinicians and 
people in recovery believe that the agential 
effort of the person trying to recover is a 
necessary ingredient for successful recovery. 
Assuming this is true, we need to know which 
agential efforts are effective in recovery from 
addiction and why.
 Holton and Berridge (2013) have developed 
one of the more convincing accounts of how 
addiction undermines self- governance while 
still accommodating the possibility of the 
agent effortfully regaining self- governance. 
Holton (2009) draws on Michael Bratman’s 
work (1999, 2007) to argue that recovery 
depends on efforts to achieve means–ends 
coherence, ends–ends consistency, and 
diachronic stability in intentional planning. 
However, on this view of agency, some __s
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aspects of the struggle against addiction 
remain unexplained. The firsthand reports of 
drug addicted and recovered persons suggest 
that a self- understanding that goes beyond 
one’s intentions is an independent factor 
relevant to self- governance. Some addicted 
people claim to be inclined to continue their 
disvalued drug- using lifestyle because it 
nevertheless makes the most sense given who 
they understand themselves to be. Similarly, 
recovery- directed plans are experienced as 
alien because those plans do not easily fit 
with their self- concept. Finally, some who 
successfully recover claim that changes 
they made to their self- concept were crucial 
factors in that success.
 This paper draws on an account of narrative 
self- constitution to argue that self- narrative 
has a significant impact on self- governance. 
The central claim is that, given a certain 
self- narrative, some futures make more sense 
than others, and we are inclined to enact 
our self- narratives so that they make sense. 
This self- narrative momentum undermines 
self- governance when it limits the agent to a 
future that she no longer values. Conversely, 
self- narrative momentum supports self- 
governance as long as the agent continues to 
value the future that his narrative is heading 
toward. If this is correct, our efforts to 
improve and maintain self- governance, such 
as when treating addiction, will be more 
effective if we rework detrimental aspects 
of self- narrative and co- produce beneficial 
self- narratives. The explanatory benefits 
(and potential therapeutic benefits) of the 
narrative account of self- governance are 
made clear by comparing it with intentional 
planning agency. The paper begins with 
a sketch of Holton and Berridge’s (2013) 
account of addicted agency. I then develop 
the narrative account before illustrating the 
greater explanatory power of the narrative 
account with reference to firsthand accounts 
of addiction.
2. Addiction and Planning Agency
 Holton and Berridge (2013) draw on 
empirical evidence from rat models to argue 
that addictive temptation differs in kind 
from typical temptation. Typical temptation 
corrupts the agent’s judgment (usually 
temporarily) so that she comes to judge the 
tempting option to be best after all (Holton 
2009). Addictive substances change the drug 
user’s brain so that she comes to intensely 
desire a substance without expecting it to 
be pleasurable and without judging that it 
is best even at the time of choice. Addictive 
temptations can therefore bypass judgment 
and motivate akratic action. But whether 
judgment is corrupted or bypassed, temptation 
can be successfully resisted through forming 
intentions (Holton 2009; Holton and Berridge 
2013).
 Intentions are the building blocks of 
planning agency (Bratman 1999). The 
agent forms an intention by deciding on 
a future course of action, for example, “I 
will walk home the long way to avoid the 
pub,” or “never have more than two drinks.” 
If an intention has been formed, then, 
when the time comes to act, the agent can 
simply implement the intention without re- 
deliberation.3 This diachronic distribution 
of cognitive effort has several advantages, 
but the most relevant here is that it allows 
the agent to avoid making decisions while 
exposed to (anticipated) temptations (Holton 
2009, pp. 3–4). If the agent has formed an 
intention mutually exclusive of indulging a 
future temptation, and he does not reconsider 
that intention, then the temptation cannot 
corrupt or bypass judgment because judgment 
is not called upon.
 Achieving self- governance is always 
effortful because it takes cognitive effort to 
make sure one’s intentions meet the norms 
of practical reason: diachronic stability, 
means–ends coherence, and ends–ends s__
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consistency (Bratman 2007). To maintain the 
diachronic stability of intentions, the agent 
has to resist reconsidering them in the face 
of temptation. Holton argues, with support 
from the ego- depletion literature, that agents 
can resist reconsidering their intentions by 
using a finite, executively controlled resource 
that he calls “willpower” (2009, p. 113). 
Because willpower is finite (or, at least, 
takes a relatively long time to replenish), 
long- lasting or frequent temptations will 
ultimately exhaust it, and intentions will 
then be reconsidered. A new intention is then 
formed, but, because temptation corrupts or 
bypasses judgment, the new intention will 
pursue the temptation. In addition to using 
willpower, efforts are required to ensure that 
intentions are means–ends coherent. The 
agent cannot just commit to an end; she needs 
to design some means by which that end can 
be achieved. If the agent fails to put in enough 
planning effort, she may remain unaware of 
her potential to attain valuable ends, and/or 
she may find that ends she has committed 
to have become unattainable or were never 
really attainable. Finally, planning efforts are 
required to ensure that intentions are ends–
ends consistent. If the agent is committed to 
intentions that are mutually exclusive, then 
each end will tend to undermine the other. The 
agent needs to work out which valuable ends 
are compatible, and make the hard choices 
of abandoning those valued ends that are 
incompatible.
 On this planning account, the struggle with 
addiction can be understood as a consistent 
failure to develop and enact a normatively 
organized set of intentions targeting one’s 
conception of the good life. The planning 
account also provides a variety of ways of 
understanding why some people struggle 
more than others to recover. Some people’s 
addictive desires may be stronger or more 
pervasive than those of others, so that greater 
planning agency is required to keep those 
desires in check. Some people may have 
relatively little reflective planning skill, a 
small amount of willpower, or might put 
in relatively little planning effort. In cases 
of poor planning, addiction will be harder 
to overcome, and addictions may persist 
even with relatively weak addictive desires. 
Recovery, therefore, requires an improvement 
in planning effort and skill or a decrease 
in addictive desire so that practical norms 
can be better followed. For example, better 
consideration of ends–ends consistency 
might reveal drug- use to be inconsistent more 
often, better means–ends planning might help 
avoid tempting situations and achieve other 
valuable ends, willpower might be improved 
through practice, and pharmacotherapy might 
dampen desire.4
 There is good reason to believe that efforts 
of intentional planning agency are important 
for self- governance in general and, more 
specifically, for recovery from addiction. 
However, in some failures of self- governance, 
addicts form intentions to use drugs without 
being overwhelmed by temptation in the 
ways Holton describes. Some people claim 
to feel tempted to use drugs because such 
intentions are in accordance with their 
established self- concepts as drug- users, not 
because they (momentarily) value drug- use 
or are overwhelmed by an addictive desire. 
Consider Crispin Sartwell’s comment, for 
example: “Every time I have raised a bottle to 
my lips . . . I could have done otherwise, and 
I did what I had to do, what my identity and 
history demanded” (2014). Some people also 
report feeling alienated from their recovery, 
especially early on. For example, Kate, 
generalizing from her own experience, says: 
“Just as a person can feel loss of identity when 
they lose a long- standing job, or their children 
have grown and left home, it is also very 
common, I believe, to feel loss of identity 
when recovering from a drug- addicted 
lifestyle” (Kate 2013). The agent will have to __s
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overcome these feelings of alienation if she 
is to successfully recover (on top of resisting 
addictive desires and improving planning).
 There are two ways we can explain these 
reports while staying within the planning 
account. First, these reports may just be a way 
to rationalize a process that is actually driven 
by desire. This is surely true in some cases, but 
it cannot explain those cases where recovery 
is initiated by changes in self- concept rather 
than changes in desire (see Isabel’s case 
below). Second, drug- use like Sartwell’s 
might be based on false, fatalistic beliefs 
that certain aspects of self- concept determine 
the future. However, an explanatory problem 
remains. Self- conceptual beliefs seem less 
malleable than other beliefs; agents seem 
to struggle to change their self- concepts in 
the face of evidence that would normally 
be sufficient to change a false belief. A self- 
concept as a drug- user appears to continue 
to implicitly undermine recovery even 
when the agent can explicitly form the true 
belief that his self- concept does not rule 
out recovery. Although their account can 
accommodate such false, implicit beliefs, 
Holton and Berridge don’t explore their role 
in addiction. In any case, they still need a 
way of explaining why the agent can change 
some detrimental beliefs more easily than 
others. A narrative self- constitution view 
provides such an explanation. The ease 
with which the agent can change a self- 
interpretation or an intention depends on 
the wider narrative structure in which those 
beliefs and intentions are embedded. Some 
self- narratives, especially some addiction- 
focussed narratives, are more difficult to 
change than others, for reasons I will outline 
below.
3. Narrative Self- Constitution
 A self- narrative is the narrator’s attempt to 
understand a temporal series of events in her 
life by specifying the causal, teleological, or 
thematic relationships between those events.5 
For example, the agent might self- narrate: 
“I used heroin in the past because it felt 
good. I will use tomorrow because I can’t 
help myself. I guess my life is just like all 
those other junkies’.” Narratives can render 
events and intentions intelligible while being 
messy and banal, highly specified or vague, 
brief or epic. They do not have to build 
up drama, provide aesthetic satisfaction, 
or be meticulously edited.6 Self- narratives 
provide more explanatory links than in a 
mere sequence of events, and less coherence 
(of theme or plot) than a literary narrative 
(Schechtman 2007, pp. 159–160).
 Narrative self- constitution views claim 
that we constitute (and reconstitute) 
ourselves through self- narration, which is 
an iterative process of self- interpretation 
and self- projection. Any state of affairs 
underdetermines how it should be narrated, 
so even when narration is purely post 
hoc and descriptive, the agent can choose 
which narrative interpretation of many best 
describes her wider self- concept.7 In narrative 
projection, the agent narrates an imagined 
future based on her current narrative self- 
interpretation, and then attempts to enact it. 
Self- interpretations limit, but do not fully 
determine, which narrative continuations 
are plausible, and so it remains for the agent 
to imagine plausible narrative continuations 
and enact the one she evaluates most highly. 
This line of thought ultimately leads to the 
view that, when we successfully enact our 
narratives, “we invent ourselves . . . but we 
really are the characters we invent” (Velle-
man 2005, p. 58). Agents self- govern to the 
extent that their self- narrative aligns with 
their conception of a good life.
 Self- narratives are not single stories, but 
collections of many partially overlapping, 
partially interconnected narrative threads. 
We create narrative threads whenever there 
are events in our lives, past and expected, 
brief or lengthy, that we want to understand 
or realize (Lloyd 1993; Wollheim 1984). 
s__
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Because human life typically involves diverse 
experiences and values, we cannot force 
everything into a single narrative. Narrative 
threads can be locally focused or can capture 
generalities, can be short- lived or lifelong, 
can intersect with or repeat other narrative 
threads or be relatively free- standing, and can 
come to a conclusion or have loose ends (Nel-
son 2001, p. 76).8 This multiple thread view of 
self- narrative allows us to make a distinction 
between “thin” and “thick” narration, 
and between “narrow” and “broad” self- 
narratives. Thin self- narration is where the 
agent creates relatively few narrative threads 
among events, leaving much unexplained. 
Conversely, thick self- narration is where 
the agent looks to understand a set of events 
in detail, and so creates numerous threads 
detailing many relevant causal, teleological, 
and thematic relations. Broad self- narratives 
have a diversity of more thickly narrated, 
semi- independent foci running in parallel, 
such as one’s career, marriage, parenthood, 
friendships, hobbies, and so on. Narrow self- 
narratives have few thickly narrated foci. 
In some cases of addiction, for example, 
drug- use and treatment have become the sole 
narrative focus.
 The key feature that distinguishes the 
narrative account from the planning account 
is the influence of narrative structure. The 
structure of the established self- narrative 
influences which narrative projections make 
the most sense and how difficult it is to 
reinterpret elements integrated in that self- 
narrative. These effects are relevant to self- 
governance when the agent needs to change 
her self- narrative to better align with her 
conception of a good life.
3.1 Effects of Narrative Structure
 Self- narratives are not just atomistic 
col lect ions  of  in tent ions  and sel f -
interpretations; in self- narration, the 
agent selectively connects intentions and 
self-interpretations to create a narrative 
structure. However, some intentions and 
self- interpretations are more easily connected 
in meaningful ways to an established self- 
narrative than others. For example, an agent 
might have self- narrated that “my repeated 
failures to recover, my intense cravings for 
drugs, the theft, lies and prostitution to pay 
for drugs, the hours spent using drugs, are all 
a result of me being a hopeless drug addict.” 
It is easier for this agent to make sense of an 
intention to, say, sell drugs to support his drug 
habit than to get a job, because it’s much less 
plausible that a hopeless drug addict would 
succeed in getting a proper job. Similarly, his 
established narrative makes it more difficult 
to accommodate a self- interpretation as, say, 
being a trustworthy person. A trustworthy 
person wouldn’t have lied and stolen, so it is 
not easy to make sense of himself that way. 
Perhaps there is some idiosyncratic narrative 
that could make sense of a hopeless drug 
addict who is nevertheless trustworthy and 
holds down a job, but it is far from obvious. 
If the agent values being trustworthy and 
holding a job, then the structure of his self- 
narrative makes self- governance difficult.
 The established self- narrative itself can 
be changed to better accommodate a more 
highly valued narrative projection, but this 
also requires cognitive effort. For example, 
the agent might try to re- narrate his existing 
self- narrative to exclude the belief that he is 
a hopeless drug addict because that belief is 
undermining narrative projections of being 
trustworthy and having a job. However, that 
belief is embedded in his narrative structure; 
by removing it, he has to find a different way 
to make sense of all the narrative threads in 
which it features. If he didn’t lie and steal 
because he was a hopeless addict, then why 
did he behave in those ways? The narrative 
account can, therefore, explain why changing 
components that are well- integrated in a 
self- narrative take more effort than changing 
components that are less well integrated in a 
self- narrative.9
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 The selective process of self- narration also 
changes the prominence and character of its 
component self- interpretations and intentions. 
Most basically, a potential intention or self- 
interpretation can be included or excluded 
from the narrative.10 If an intention or self- 
interpretation is included, it can be more 
or less highlighted according to how often 
it is connected with other parts of the self- 
narrative. If being a hopeless drug addict, for 
example, is connected in multiple memories 
and expectations of treatment, career, and 
relationships, then, whenever treatment, 
career, or relationships are relevant, the 
idea of being a hopeless drug addict is at 
the forefront of thought. If the thought of 
being a hopeless drug addict is demoralizing 
and encourages fatalism, then a narrative 
that highlights this self- interpretation will 
undermine self- governance more than a 
narrative that does not. An intention or self- 
interpretation is also changed in character by 
the content of the other parts of the narrative 
that it is connected to. For example, if the 
agent has narrated that he began using heroin 
to cope with the death of his partner, then 
the character of his desire for heroin and his 
intentions to use heroin will be different from 
those of someone who just began to use heroin 
as an extension of a hedonistic lifestyle. In 
the former case, but not the latter, his desires 
and intentions may typically come with 
melancholic feelings because his narrative 
has fixed this association. If the agent also has 
difficulties coping with sadness in general, 
then this association might make his addiction 
more severe because a desire for heroin 
could be triggered by either withdrawal or 
feelings of sadness. So self- interpretations 
and intentions are not atomistic but change 
in prominence and character according to 
how they are narratively connected. To the 
extent that any component of a self- narrative 
undermines self- governance, this effect 
is changed in character and amplified or 
dampened by the way it is connected in the 
self- narrative. Broader self- narratives with a 
range of focal points underpin a range of ways 
to experience, think, and develop different 
socially verified self- understandings. So, if 
an addict’s self- narrative has narrowed to 
a few foci, as is often the case in long- term 
addiction narrative, momentum will be harder 
to overcome. Most other potential narrative 
continuations will be difficult to make sense 
of for both the agent and his peers, and 
most thought and experience will be pre- 
reflectively centered on addiction, drug- use, 
and treatment.
 The planning account treats self- conceptual 
beliefs atomistically. Therefore, it cannot 
explain how the strength and character of 
beliefs depend on their specific relationships 
with each other, and how the strength and 
character of intentions depend on their 
specific relationships with beliefs; nor can it 
explain how those relationships might make it 
more difficult to change beliefs and intentions. 
On the planning account, the agent’s belief 
that he is a hopeless drug addict might prevent 
him from getting a job because he mistakenly 
believes certain means are unavailable. But 
there seems to be no reason why the agent 
would struggle to take advantage of those 
additional means when they were pointed 
out to him. Neither is it clear why he would 
hesitate to change a self- conceptual belief 
when he saw that it was undermining his 
self- governance. The narrative account, in 
contrast, can explain these challenges to 
self- governance. The clearest meaningful 
continuations of the agent’s established self- 
narrative may not easily accommodate the 
best means to his valued ends. Therefore, 
even if he knows of those means, he may 
feel unable to adopt them because they seem 
implausible. Detrimental self- interpretations 
can be embedded in the established self- 
narrative structure so that changing them will 
require significant reinterpretative effort. The 
agent may be unwilling or unable to put in 
that effort.
s__
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Intersubjective Effects  
on Narrative Structure
 Self- narration is further complicated by 
intersubjective influences. The individual 
cannot unilaterally decide which self- 
narrative structures make most sense; to some 
extent, his peers must also be satisfied that his 
narrative makes sense. Each agent depends 
on his peers to verify, or at least not reject, 
his self- narrative threads in order for them 
to be genuinely self- constitutive.11 When 
self- governance requires the agent to deviate 
from socially verified narrative trajectories, 
it is difficult for both the agent and his peers 
to believe that such self- narration is possible 
even if it would not break any norm of 
practical reason.
 The agent does not self- narrate in isolation; 
rather, his self- narrative is heavily co- authored 
from the first because he draws on the cultural 
store of narrative archetypes, and his peers 
contribute more specific content. Narrative 
archetypes include fairy tales, legends, and 
a wide range of stereotypical narratives of 
varying generality, for example: boys grow 
up liking trucks, cars, and guns while girls 
prefer dolls, makeup, horses, and dressing 
up; men’s midlife crises involve buying sports 
cars; heroin use begins as fun or escape but 
inevitably ends in misery and often death. 
Narrative archetypes provide shortcuts to 
understanding our lives by suggesting content 
and structure for our narratives. If we are slow 
to pick up on relevant archetypes, our peers 
are on hand to apply them to us. This is most 
clearly the case when we are young because 
we have not yet learnt to self- narrate, and we 
adopt those archetypes relatively uncritically. 
As Nelson points out:
We enter society . . . with one or more imputed 
characters—roles into which we have been 
drafted—and we have to learn what they are 
in order to be able to understand how others 
respond to us and how our responses to them 
are apt to be construed. (Nelson 2001, p. 56)
 For example, the gender archetypes applied 
to children let them know that their gender 
is expected to be a crucial part of their self- 
narrative; gender archetypes guide, among 
other things, what one should like and how 
one should feel.12 Although archetypes 
always involve an element of coercion13 
(being general rather than personal), some 
set of archetypes is necessary to build a base 
from which the child can begin to self- narrate; 
children cannot self- narrate from scratch. 
“Deprive children of stories and you leave 
then unscripted, anxious stutterers in their 
action as in their words” (MacIntyre 1984, 
p. 216). Even as mature self- narrators, we 
continue to depend on archetypes for self- 
understanding to some extent, especially 
when we face unfamiliar experience. When 
faced with a terminal cancer diagnosis, for 
example, archetypes suggest the patient might 
feel anger, be in denial, write a “bucket list,” 
or discover a heightened value in everyday 
activities. When facing addiction, archetypes 
suggest the agent will be unhealthy, fatalistic, 
untrustworthy, and have to hit rock bottom 
before he can recover. Archetypes suggest 
self- interpretations that the agent should 
be sensitive to, and actions that should 
be considered or rejected; feelings and 
actions that are excluded from archetypes 
are implicitly discouraged. In addition 
to archetypes, conspecifics provide more 
specific co- authoring for our self- narratives. 
Others tell us about the features of our lives 
that matter to them, and many practical 
identities depend on other people for their 
construction and maintenance (Nelson 
2001, pp. 81–82n3). For example, the agent 
can only live the narrative of a husband 
if someone will marry him, and he learns 
about the kind of husband he is through 
what his partner says about him. Because 
self- narration depends on socially sourced 
and verified content, social constraints are 
inherent in that content and, therefore, all 
self- narratives are ingrained with various, 
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often subtle, social expectations of the way 
narratives can meaningfully develop. The 
agent can still self- narrate in novel ways, 
usually by building on or adjusting socially 
sourced content. However, as he strays 
further from socially shared and endorsed 
archetypes, it becomes more difficult for 
his peers to understand his narrative, and 
so he has to put in more effort to have his 
narrative accepted. So, if an agent has a 
self- narrative as a heavy drug user, the most 
easily socially accepted continuation of that 
narrative is where he follows the archetypal 
path, becoming addicted and undermining 
his own values. If the agent wants to have a 
different narrative continuation accepted by 
his peers, he needs to convince people why 
the dominant archetype doesn’t apply in his 
case. The further his narrative deviates from 
social expectations, the more difficult it is to 
convince people that it is self- constitutive. 
The archetype- informed social expectations 
of self- narration channel the possibilities 
for self- constitution, leaving some narrative 
continuations open while making others 
compulsory, difficult, or impossible.
 When the agent wants to narrate contrary 
to consistently socially verified narrative 
threads, she might not only struggle to 
convince others that the contrary narrative 
thread is true, but she may also struggle to 
convince herself. Even though self- narrative 
threads begin as being one possibility among 
many, over time, the agent comes to take them 
as representing facts about who she is and who 
she can hope to become. As a result, contrary 
narrative threads seem delusional or alien and 
may not even be entertained. Therefore, the 
more unanimous and long- standing the social 
endorsement of a narrative thread, the more 
difficult it is to change. An addicted person, 
for example, will typically create a socially 
endorsed self- narrative around his drug- use 
and treatment by drawing on certain relevant 
archetypes. The longer his addiction narrative 
is socially confirmed, the more he will believe 
that it represents the truth about who he is. 
When self- governance requires the agent to 
narrate contrary to a long- standing, socially 
endorsed narrative thread, then the agent must 
overcome feelings of alienation in addition 
to putting forth the cognitive effort required 
to make the new narrative plausible. The 
case of Kate below illustrates how alienation 
might be overcome by creating new narrative 
threads.14
 On the planning view, the agent sticks to her 
intentions because she values them or because 
they support other valued intentions. On 
such a view, there is no reason to maintain a 
disvalued intention if other valued intentions 
no longer rely on it for diachronic stability. 
However, on the narrative view, the agent 
may maintain disvalued intentions and 
disvalued self- interpretations because she has 
meaningfully embedded them in consistently, 
socially verified self- narrative threads; those 
intentions are no longer options for action, but 
appear to her and others to be facts about who 
she is and who she can plausibly become.15 
The planning theorist might argue that, if the 
agent values self- understanding and being 
understood by others, she will adopt means to 
achieve those ends. One of the means to those 
ends will be to explain any deviation from 
social expectations. The narrative account 
adds to this by indicating exactly what work is 
required to have such explanations accepted. 
The effort required depends on the mismatch 
between the content and structure of the local 
narrative archetypes and the content and 
structure of her existing narrative.
 In summary, our established, socially 
verified narrative threads have a momentum 
toward the outcomes that make the most 
sense to the agent and her peers (as informed 
by narrative archetypes). As long as the agent 
values the life guided by her established 
narrative threads, the narrative momentum 
of those threads supports self- governance. 
To the extent that the established narrative 
threads clash with her conception of a good 
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life, narrative momentum undermines self- 
governance. In the latter case, the agent 
will want to adjust her self- narrative to 
reconnect with her conception of a good 
life and thereby regain her self- governance. 
The further that the agent wants to deviate 
from established, socially verified narrative 
threads, the more effort she has to put into 
making that re- narration plausible to herself 
and others. If this narrative view is correct, 
then recovery from addiction will often be 
much more difficult than if the agent just 
had to replace drug- using intentions and 
beliefs with recovery- directed intentions 
and beliefs. Recovery will also require the 
agent to change the structure of her narrative 
in which those intentions and beliefs are 
embedded, to reverse the momentum created 
by her addiction self- narrative. That, in any 
case, is the theory. We can find support for 
this theory in the self- narratives of Isabel and 
Kate.
4. Narrative Effects on Recovery 
from Addiction
Isabel
 Isabel’s recovery from addiction depended 
on a significant change in her self- narrative, 
not a change in intentions or a lucky change 
in circumstance. It was only subsequent 
to her self- narrative change that she could 
adopt new intentions, strengthen her belief 
in her ability to recover, and begin to access 
more rewarding non- drug alternatives. 
Isabel’s addiction is arguably entrenched by 
detrimental narrative momentum; by working 
to change that narrative, she alleviates 
the momentum and improves her self- 
governance.
 Isabel’s mother died when she was eleven 
years old, and, unknown to her at the time, 
her father had another, secret family. As an 
adult, she became addicted to opiates, and 
she had two children. She first entered detox 
when her partner died, but immediately 
relapsed. Later, she was in a new relationship 
and had begun drinking heavily. Her father 
had just died, and, at that time, she found 
out about his other family. She entered a 
new treatment program with her current 
boyfriend; however, six weeks into treatment, 
she received her inheritance, and so they left 
treatment and spent the money on prescription 
benzodiazepines.
I was aware by now that I wasn’t living as I 
wanted to, but I felt incapable of doing anything 
about it. . . . My existence was literally getting 
all these scripts and we still couldn’t get enough 
benzodiazepines, so I was still doing all these 
private doctors, and the NHS doctors—I gave 
false names as a temporary patient, and that 
required some organisation, I can tell you, for 
somebody whose mind was befuddled. (Isabel, 
quoted in Addenbrooke 2011, pp. 67, 69)
 At the end of this extended benzodiazepine 
binge, Isabel goes into treatment for what 
happens to be the final time.
I was a pound over twenty stone [280 lbs.]. I 
could hardly walk. It was terrible. . . . I had all 
these sores and abscesses all over my legs. . . . 
The methadone was so concentrated it used to 
create these burns that would get infected. . . . 
I felt I was never going to be any good. . . . 
I’d really lost myself, I can’t really begin to 
describe—I’d gone from, in my early twenties, 
this person that everybody had so much hope 
in, the good person, the star, the amiable one, 
the problem solver [to this]. (Isabel, quoted in 
Addenbrooke 2011, p. 69)
 Isabel’s self- narrative is that of a steadily 
worsening, repeatedly relapsing addict who 
will never be any good. People who have 
struggled like this for so long rarely recover; 
they struggle on to eventually die by overdose 
or succumb to other drug- related health 
problems. Indeed, her family was against 
her going into treatment again because, after 
each prior round of treatment, her addiction 
had gotten worse. Such co- authoring suggests 
that only a disvalued future is possible for 
Isabel whether she seeks treatment or not. 
However, she does enter treatment, and this 
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round of treatment was crucially different to 
prior ones. She describes it as follows:
She [the social worker] did see something in 
me, and I felt that was really positive. But the 
other good thing about her was that she kind of 
explained things to me. In the past people made 
off the cuff remarks but nobody explained to 
me that broken attachments earlier in my life 
affected how I operated today. So I might have 
feelings of loss now that would be magnified 
because of feelings of loss earlier. . . . Key 
workers before had said, “Do this, do that,” and 
I would tend to play the game. I would be the 
perfect patient. But now I was able to show the 
other side of me, that isn’t the lovely, easygoing, 
compliant person. I was able to just be me. 
(Isabel, quoted in Addenbrooke 2011, p. 70)
 The key worker helped Isabel by considering 
Isabel’s personal history and then suggesting 
a narrative reinterpretation tailored to her 
specific case. Isabel is informed that feelings 
of loss now might be magnified by feelings 
of loss earlier in her life. This information 
is relevant to her life because her mother 
died when she was eleven years old, and she 
subsequently suffered other significant losses 
with the death of her partner and her father. 
She uses this information to reinterpret her 
narrative history of drug- use from one of self- 
indulgent disgrace to an extended struggle to 
cope with the loss of her mother at a young 
age. This reinterpretation suggests that her 
addiction can be controlled by coming to 
terms with the original loss. After reworking 
her narrative, she can see the relevance of 
planning solutions that were not apparent 
before, such as finding better means of 
dealing with feelings of loss in general. 
This narrative reinterpretation of the past 
helps set the foundation for a projection of 
recovery. It makes more sense that someone 
who understands and manages her feelings 
of loss can recover, as compared to a person 
who is regularly overcome by inexplicably 
strong feelings of loss. A plausible path to 
recovery is revealed—if she can deal with 
her emotional issues, she can control her 
drug- use. This begins to change recovery 
from merely being something she evaluates 
positively into a genuinely plausible narrative 
trajectory for her.
 The narrative account predicts that changes 
to self- narration of one’s past will be 
important when making significant changes to 
projected narrative, because the narrative has 
to make socially verified sense throughout. 
The planning account, in contrast, ignores 
the need for any reinterpretation of the past 
(assuming one’s beliefs are true). Intentions 
may have to be formed in light of occasional 
strong feelings of loss, but those feelings 
are taken as a fixed aspect of the contingent 
context for planning. Of course, Isabel could 
have adopted a policy to try to dampen those 
feelings of loss, and that may well have 
helped, but it was not until she changed her 
self- narrative that she could see that such 
a policy might be helpful. Without careful 
consideration of Isabel’s self- narrative, 
social workers had tried to get her to adopt 
generalized policies to little effect by saying 
“do this, do that.” Even though Isabel could 
follow those policies briefly by “playing 
the game,” it is not surprising that such an 
approach ultimately failed because those 
policies were relatively incompatible with 
her self- narrative as it stood.
 Isabel’s reinterpretation of her self- narrative 
arguably also changes the motivational effects 
of certain elements in her self- narrative in 
ways that improve her self- governance. Isabel 
claims that she was motivated to recover by 
recognizing a significant parallel between her 
own narrative and that of her daughter:
The real underpinning, the thing that was 
preying on my mind, was that my daughter was 
about to be ten, and I was scared that I would die 
and she’d end up without a mum—like I had. 
(Isabel, quoted in Addenbrooke 2011, p. 69)
 Presumably, Isabel had always had some 
commitment to intentions aimed at being a 
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good mother. After all, she had managed to 
keep custody of her daughter throughout. 
However, her narrative reinterpretation 
reshaped and strengthened the motivational 
effect of those intentions. Her narrative 
reinterpretation makes the link between the 
death of her own mother and her subsequent 
addiction exceedingly clear. As a result, she 
can now see that her own death would not 
just be traumatic for her daughter but it could 
saddle her daughter with the same inability 
to deal with loss. So this new narrative 
context strengthens the policy to stay alive 
for her daughter because to fail in that policy 
would not just cause a one- off trauma, but 
it could consign her daughter to lifelong 
misery. Furthermore, Isabel is all too well 
acquainted with the misery of addicted life, 
so anticipating this particular future for her 
daughter is likely to be more motivating than 
anticipating a less familiar future that she 
could only imagine rather abstractly.
Kate
 Kate’s recovery from addiction is interesting 
because she feels alienated from her nascent 
recovery even once she has successfully 
replaced her drug- using intentions. She 
reports feeling tempted to return to her 
addicted life because it feels more real. 
Success in her recovery seems to depend 
on her ability to build narrative connections 
between her addicted life and her recovered 
life so that she doesn’t lose her connection 
with her past and her new life doesn’t feel 
alien. We can understand these factors with 
reference to narrative momentum, but they 
cannot be easily explained on an intention- 
focused account. To begin with, consider 
Kate’s self- narrative from when she was 
addicted:
I had established myself as a druggie. My 
friends and family knew me as such, and in a 
way I was proud of my varied life experiences 
and my street- smarts. I’d had an older boyfriend 
who had introduced me to the drug scene, and 
who I learnt a lot of drug- taking practices from. 
I took pride in the fact that I knew more about 
drug taking than most my own age. . . . At 
age 18, I already knew how to cook and filter 
different drugs for IV use, and how to prepare 
poppies to extract the opium, I knew dosages 
and strengths for illicit use of prescription meds, 
I knew all sorts about scoring and smoking dope 
and lots of quirky little tricks for increasing 
your buzz. . . . I became involved in crime, 
and in a way, I was proud that I was “cunning 
and resourceful.” Seeing as I’d not done much 
else with myself over those formative years of 
early adulthood, I didn’t have a heck of a lot 
else going on with my sense of identity. I had 
gone to a good school and worked at a couple 
of elegant cafés in my teenage years, and was 
quite proud of those things. (Kate 2013)
 Kate’s narrative describes a set of drug- 
using intentions and alludes to others related 
to crime; however, those intentions do not 
stand alone. Her intentions are narratively 
interwoven with other representations of her 
life, specific emotions, people, places, and 
times. Her drug- use intentions are intimately 
connected with a wider self- narrative that 
grounds her understanding of who she was at 
the time, and this becomes significant when 
she tries to recover.
When I met my current partner, who does not 
use drugs, at age 21, although I was still us-
ing it became increasingly clear that it wasn’t 
acceptable to be living like I had been, and I 
began to lose touch with some of my drug scene 
acquaintances. I was also pretty burnt out, hav-
ing had about a year of methamphetamine use, 
and six months of heavier near- daily use. . . . I 
began to leave my drug identity behind, but felt 
like I didn’t have much else to equate myself 
with, there was a real void. I had a daughter at 
age 23, and I began studying “youthwork” at 
age 24. I still drank and smoked dope. I was in 
counselling around my 24th and 25th birthdays 
and I had made a lot of progress. I hadn’t used 
hard drugs for a few years.
 I felt not so much like I missed the druggie 
lifestyle, but that I was starting to lose my 
grip on who I was, and was finding it hard to 
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function. I was tempted to return to old habits 
for it was all I knew. I felt like I was a sell- 
out and was disloyal to my past. I felt like if 
I moved on I’d have nothing, just a big void 
on my CV, where a whole bunch of jobs and 
study should have been. . . . When you’ve lived 
all that to such an intensity, it’s hard, and feels 
quite disloyal to move on and forget it. You fear 
forgetting it, in all its realness and richness. 
(Kate 2013)
 Kate describes two related challenges to 
her recovery that are difficult to understand if 
recovery is solely about changing intentions. 
First, even when she is successfully enacting 
intentions around motherhood and studying, 
she feels alienated from her recovery and 
reports struggling to function. She recalls 
being tempted to return to drug- use because 
she “knew” it better. The narrative view 
can make sense of this because her drug- 
using narrative was central to her self- 
understanding for so long. She has gone to a 
lot of effort to develop it, and it was socially 
verified—as she says, “my friends and family 
knew me as such.” Comparatively, her new 
intentions have not yet been so thoroughly 
integrated with her self- narrative. She has 
not had the time to develop the multitude of 
socially verified, interconnecting narrative 
threads that make her addicted past seem so 
real.
 Second, her drug- using history continues 
to have a value to her even if drug- use itself 
does not, and she fears losing that history. 
She suggests that, if recovery necessitated 
totally cutting off her addicted past, she 
would be motivated to return to drug- use to 
protect that part of her self. The narrative 
view can explain the value she places on 
her drug- using self- concept because it is not 
just a set of, now redundant, practical tools 
but a self- understanding.16 Kate’s fear at 
losing that large part of her self- concept is 
understandable because she has relatively 
few narrative threads linking her drug- using 
life to her new life. She moves suddenly 
from a narrow, drug- use narrative without 
“a heck of a lot else going on” to a narrative 
focused on motherhood and education. Being 
educated and a good mother are far from the 
archetypal narrative outcomes of intense 
drug- use; therefore, the narrative connections 
that would meaningfully link her past to 
her present are harder to develop. Kate has 
to narrate those connections without much 
supportive co- authoring. Her concern for her 
past does not make sense on an intentional 
planning view where recovery just involves 
abandoning drug- using intentions and 
replacing them with other intentions. Kate 
had done that, so there should not have been 
any further issue as long as she was happy 
with those intentions.
 The narrative view suggests, therefore, that 
recovering addicts (and treatment) should 
aim to narratively connect past drug- use with 
developing recovery to avoid alienating both 
their pasts and recoveries. As it happens, this 
is exactly what Kate does.
Around my 24th birthday I had a big poppy 
design tattooed on my thigh. It’s my way 
of remembering and respecting what I went 
through. . . . Over the years I found I didn’t 
forget the druggie life as I had feared. My 
role is now more about being an “ex- user,” 
and I’m comfortable with that. I also made 
some progress on professionalising my past 
deviances, by using my experience with drugs 
to help others—recently becoming a board 
member at an organisation that provides needle 
exchange services and also studying trauma, 
loss and grief. This has further cemented my 
new identity and filled the void I felt. (Kate 
2013)
 The narrative thread she develops around 
her tattoo provides a link between her present 
and her past that she is reminded of whenever 
she considers the tattoo. Furthermore, by 
“professionalizing her past deviances,” she 
develops meaningful connections between 
her new intentions and her history of drug- 
use without having to maintain drug- using 
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intentions themselves. As long as Kate did 
not relapse, her recovery narrative would be 
consistently socially verified, making it feel 
more real over time; this aligns with her report 
that “over the years,” her recovered life came 
to feel increasingly “comfortable.”17
Conclusion
 Narrative self- constitution views provide 
a way of understanding why recovery from 
addiction can be so difficult. Agents do not 
just have to overcome contrary desires, 
change fatalistic beliefs, and improve 
their planning agency, but they also need 
to overcome narrative momentum. The 
momentum of addiction self- narratives 
tends to pre- reflectively guide the agent’s 
thought and experience toward drug- use; 
she takes that consistently socially verified 
addiction narrative to represent facts about 
who she can become. The more narrowly 
the self- narrative is focused on addiction, the 
more pronounced the narrative momentum. 
When recovery intentions, and the narrative 
continuations they nest within, clash with 
that established self- narrative, they are 
experienced as relatively alien and unrealistic. 
The incumbent addiction narrative is less 
alienating even though it guides thought 
and action toward a relatively narrow, and 
typically disvalued, set of possible futures. 
The cases of Isabel and Kate suggest that 
people sometimes prefer to avoid being 
alienated from well- established self- narrative 
threads despite the cost to self- governance.
 Detrimental narrative momentum can be 
overcome through reinterpretation of self- 
narrative and the construction of new narrative 
threads. Isabel reinterpreted her past to make 
a recovered future seem more realistic for her; 
only then could she adopt recovery- directed 
intentions. Kate overcame her alienation 
from her recovery and broadened her self- 
narrative by developing narrative threads 
that connected her recovery with her past. 
Presumably, narrative momentum is present 
to some extent in all struggles with addiction, 
indeed in any self- narrator’s struggle for 
self- governed action. However, in some 
cases, such as those of Isabel and Kate, these 
narrative effects arguably make the difference 
between continuing addiction and recovery.
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to the arguments. The Centre for Cultural Diversity and Wellbeing at Victoria University, Melbourne, 
generously provided office space during the writing of this paper.
1. Not all trajectories of addiction are like this. Some people may never find that their drug- use clashes 
problematically with their other values. In those cases, self- governance is not undermined by drug- use. 
For convenience of exposition, I focus on drug addiction as opposed to other addictions, but the argu-
ments should generalize across all forms of addiction.
2. I refer here to a subjective conception of a good life, which need not meet intersubjective standards 
of the “good.” This entails that “evil” people can self- govern. A more complete autonomy may require 
that one’s conception of the good life meet intersubjective standards, but by limiting our focus to self- 
governance rather than autonomy, this complication is set aside.
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3. The agent still needs to make a judgment as to whether the conditions to enact the intention are met. 
Intentions may be rationally abandoned if the agent correctly judges that new information, unavailable 
to her intention- forming self, renders that intention redundant. Holton sketches an account of how this 
judgment can be made without reconsidering the content of the original decision (Holton 2009, pp. 
123–124).
4. It’s also likely, as Levy (2006) argues, that networks of intentions will have to be carefully supported 
with pre- commitments; for example, an alcoholic could take disulfiram to produce an immediate negative 
response if he drinks alcohol. I take it that pre- commitments are rarely, if ever, ends in themselves, and 
so the planning agent will usually treat them as a subset of means available to support the goal intentions 
they are committed to. As such, pre- commitments still require the agent to engage in reflective means–end 
planning. So, although people trying to recover from addiction may rely more heavily than others on 
pre- commitments, the effective use of pre- commitments still depends on intentional planning agency.
5. It is a requirement for having a self- narrative that the agent be able to articulate relevant parts of 
that narrative when prompted (Schechtman 1996, pp. 114ff). Presumably, something similar is true 
on the intentional planning view; the agent must be able to articulate relevant parts of his network of 
intentions to be said to have those intentions. A complication here is that there are true stories told about 
self- narrators that those narrators cannot presently articulate, and those narratives contribute to their 
social identity (Mackenzie and Poltera 2010, pp. 45–46; Nelson 2001, p. 91). Perhaps it can also be 
said that agents have intentions that they cannot articulate. For present purposes, I set this complication 
aside. I concentrate on potentially articulable (if not actually articulated) self- narrative and intentions 
because they need to be articulable if the agent is to self- govern in light of them.
6. Narrative self- constitution is compatible with there being non- narrative aspects to the self- 
conceptions of self- narrators, for example, representations of one’s body image, size, and shape. It is 
also compatible with many non- narrators having a completely non- narrative self- conception, such as 
young children, some animals, and those with severe dementia. “Autobiography . . . isn’t life. It’s a 
narrative structure that makes sense of life” (Nelson 2001, p. 62).
7. Self- concepts include agents’ interpretations of the unchangeable aspects of what they are (e.g., 
gender, race, certain bodily features), contingent constitutive features of their environment (e.g., where 
they were born and raised, who their parents are), the medley of accidents, windfalls, unexpected 
consequences that happen to them (e.g., surviving car accidents, meeting one’s future spouse at the 
hospital), and future inevitabilities (e.g., puberty, menopause, death).
8. As a result of biological and normative pressures, the narrator and the protagonist are almost always 
the same person in each of the threads in a self- narrative. In schizophrenia, there may sometimes seem 
to be two narrators, one of which is not the protagonist. In cases of dissociative identity disorder, the 
narrator/protagonist unit changes over time, creating two or more distinct self- narratives (which may 
share some history and may later be reconciled).
9. In order to regain self- governance, the agent might sometimes be advised to reinterpret his past in 
ways that are dubious or outright false. This would be an extension of the “fake- it- till- you- make- it” 
strategy whereby the agent doesn’t just set out an ambitious future self- concept but also creates a his-
tory that would make sense of it. There are, however, limits to this approach, since successful narrative 
projections depend on sufficiently accurate self- interpretations. For further discussion of these issues, 
see McConnell and Snoek (2012).
10. The specific focus provided by self- narration is usually beneficial because it helps the agent bring 
higher cognition to bear on the events narrated, while clearing his mind of extraneous events and 
relations. In some cases, detrimental effects of desires and beliefs might be reduced by deliberately 
excluding them from narrative, reducing their prominence in conscious thought (see Kennett and Mc-
Connell 2013).
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11. Perhaps it is possible that someone could successfully constitute herself in a way that was incorrectly 
rejected by everybody. For my purposes, I only need it to be true that such self- constitution is much 
more difficult than self- constituting in more socially acceptable ways. Françoise Baylis (2011, 2012) 
has argued that the social constraints on what counts as real are exhaustive, at least when it comes to 
self- narration. There may be further objective and subjective constraints on reality that are relevant 
to self- narration (see Schechtman 1996; and Nelson 2001), but that debate is tangential to our current 
focus.
12. Karen Jones makes a related point in the context of developing an understanding of emotion “in 
the stories we tell each other about what it is like to have an emotion of a particular kind, stories shape 
our understanding of what is to count as (romantic) love, what lovers do, what they feel, and who may 
be properly loved by whom” (Jones 2008, p. 270).
13. The less well a narrative archetype fits with an agent’s subjective experience, the more alien it will 
seem; a possible narrative for someone’s life but not the agent’s life (Mackenzie 2008, p. 124). When 
subjective experience and social constraints conflict, it is sometimes difficult to know whether the agent 
is deluded or under coercion. To simplify my analysis, I set aside these conflicts and just consider the 
effects that self- narratives have on self- governance where agents self- narrate within social constraints.
14. Presumably, there are also feelings of alienation when the agent acts contrary to her values, so 
why would alienation drive an addict to pursue her established self- narrative rather than her values? I 
cannot do justice to this issue here, but I suggest that it will feel more alienating to act against a thickly 
narrated, consistently socially verified self- narrative focus than a less consistently verified, thinner self- 
narrative focus. In many cases of addiction, the drug- use narrative has become much thicker and more 
consistently verified than the narrative threads that would be consistent with one’s values. Therefore, 
it would be more alienating to act against the disvalued narrative than to act against one’s values.
15. Richard Holton (2009) points out that, on this view, self- narratives have a double life operating 
as both beliefs and intentions; we see our self- narrative as facts about who we are and as paths we are 
committed to. Work still needs to be done to clarify the metaphysical relationship between intentions, 
beliefs, and self- narratives.
16. Christman makes a similar point when he argues that remembering has an intrinsic non- instrumental 
value: “The value of remembering . . . inheres in our valuation of ourselves, or to put it less tendentiously 
(and to make room for regret and shame), the importance of having a coherent self- concept involves 
memory, and, hence, memory inherits such importance” (Christman 2008, p. 149).
17. Although the development of narrative threads appears to overcome feelings of alienation in Kate’s 
case, narrative threads do not necessarily reduce alienation. Narrative threads may not provide what 
Marya Schechtman (2001) calls “empathic access”; for example, the agent may adopt narratives that 
others provide her to describe periods of intoxication that she cannot remember. Despite adopting 
those narrative threads as her own, she cannot psychologically inhabit those times (Wollheim 1984, 
pp. 105–106). I take it that self- narration supports empathic access to past experience, but that it cannot 
create empathic access to periods that completely lack subjective phenomenal experience.
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